Administrative Aspects of Investment-Based Social Security Reform by John B. Shoven
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Administrative Aspects of Investment-Based Social Security
Reform
Volume Author/Editor: John B. Shoven, editor
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-75485-5
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/shov00-1
Publication Date: January 2000
Chapter Title: Introduction to "Administrative Aspects of Investment-Based
Social Security Reform"
Chapter Author: John B. Shoven
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7466
Chapter pages in book: (p. 1 - 8)Introduction 
John B. Shoven 
This volume contains five research papers presented at a National Bureau 
of Economic Research (NBER) conference on the administrative costs of 
individual accounts as part of social security reform held on 4 December 
1998 in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The conference also featured a panel 
of financial industry representatives commenting on the costs and feasibil- 
ity of a mandatory individual account component of  a reformed social 
security system. The remarks of the panelists are included in this volume. 
Also included are the remarks of the conference participants in the general 
discussion sessions. 
There are many potential advantages of individual accounts as part of 
social security reform. First and foremost is that it is easier to generate 
and protect  a real and significant accumulation of assets in individual 
accounts with accompanying property rights than in the central trust fund 
of social security. The additional personal and national saving facilitated 
by the individual accounts structure translates in the long run into a higher 
standard of living for workers. The additional saving potentially generated 
by  a reformed social security system would earn a substantial real rate of 
return for the economy as a whole unlike the pay-as-you-go system, which 
merely transfers resources from workers to retirees. A second advantage 
of the individual accounts is that they provide a direct link between the 
contributions of workers and the benefits that they receive in retirement. 
This transforms what is now a distortionary tax and transfer system into 
a true pension system. Under many of the partial privatization plans, some 
of the current payroll tax would be converted into deferred compensation. 
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This means that social security reform can amount to tax reduction and 
reform with the accompanying improvements in the efficiency of the econ- 
omy. At the very least, the partial privatization plans avoid the major in- 
creases in the payroll tax that would be necessary to restore the solvency 
of the existing social security system. 
Still, despite these and  other advantages, the advocates of  individual 
accounts must answer one major criticism. Critics of this approach argue 
that a system of approximately 140 million small individual accounts will 
be extremely expensive to run. The present social security system has rela- 
tively low administrative costs. Adding an expensive set of individual ac- 
counts could potentially wipe out all the alleged advantages of this type 
of  reform. There are many types of expenses to consider. These include 
the costs of communicating with participants,  the record-keeping costs 
borne by  individual workers, their employers, the investment managers, 
and the government, and the investment-management fees of the money 
managers. Depending on how the system is set up, the various investment 
managers may spend vast amounts marketing their services. If the admin- 
istrative costs are large relative to the earnings of the assets in the individ- 
ual accounts, then the whole advantage of the approach will  have been 
lost. The purpose of this conference and volume is to explore the costs of 
various ways of setting up individual accounts as part of a reformed social 
security system. 
This volume is different from many NBER books that feature papers 
on an assortment of related topics. Four of the six chapters in this volume 
deal with precisely the same topic. The issue is how a system of individual 
social security accounts can be set up in a cost-effective way.  Goldberg 
and Graetz, Schieber and Shoven, James et al., and Diamond all indepen- 
dently tackle this issue. Fortunately, there is  more agreement than dis- 
agreement among their findings. All of them find that administrative costs 
are an important issue. They also all find that implementing a prudently 
designed system can dramatically reduce these costs. Several of  the cost 
elements (particularly those related to record keeping) are essentially fixed 
charges per account. If costs are to be allocated in proportion to assets in 
the accounts,  this implies that there will  be  a cross-subsidization from 
large accounts to small ones. The important element of fixed costs also 
means that costs as a percentage of assets should fall as the accounts be- 
come larger through time. 
Goldberg and Graetz concentrate on two important sources of cost sav- 
ing. First, they suggest that the existing program of wage  reporting and 
payroll-tax collecting and crediting be used to collect and credit contribu- 
tions to the new individual accounts. They assert that piggybacking on the 
existing payroll-deduction system would mean that there would be very 
little incremental cost in collecting the contributions. Second, they suggest 
that the government organize a simple “bare-bones’’ investment program Introduction  3 
with a limited number of funds managed by  private companies. They es- 
timate that the total administrative costs of this “no-frills’’ option could 
range between 0.3 and 0.5 percent of assets within three to four years of 
the start of the program. In addition to this basic service, Goldberg and 
Graetz suggest that privately sponsored funds with additional investment 
options and services could compete for the individual account assets. The 
presence of  and competition  from the cost-efficient bare-bones govern- 
ment-sponsored plan would discipline the private-sector offerings. None- 
theless, the private-sector plans would face some government regulation. 
Goldberg  and Graetz  suggest  that  a  symmetrical two-part  program 
could be  designed for the distribution  phase of  the individual account 
program. Social security could offer to annuitize the individual account ac- 
cumulation at the time of retirement by simply supplementing the regular 
defined-benefit pension annuity. Private insurance companies could com- 
pete with this government program by selling inflation-indexed life annuit- 
ies directly to retirees. Once again, competition between the two programs 
would discipline the terms of the private-sector plans. Still, there would 
be government regulation to assure the financial soundness of the private 
market products. 
Schieber and Shoven analyze very similar cost-efficient ways of organiz- 
ing individual accounts. They survey the experience with privatized and 
partially  privatized social security programs in  other countries  (Chile, 
Australia, the United Kingdom, and Sweden). They note that Australia 
has a relatively new program, begun in 1973 and still in its start-up phase. 
Nonetheless, the average administrative costs for the private accounts was 
0.835 percent of assets in 1997. As one would expect, the average cost is 
going down fairly rapidly as the  average account  size is  growing. This 
again reflects the fact that administrative costs have a large fixed-cost el- 
ement to them. In general, U.S.  financial markets are far more efficient 
and competitive than Australian markets. Therefore, we should be able to 
administer a program  of individual accounts  for less than the Austra- 
lians do. 
Schieber and Shoven also examine the administrative cost experience of 
U.S.  401(k) accounts. In  1997, the average total administrative cost for 
401(k) plans was 0.77 percent of assets. There are reasons why social secu- 
rity individual accounts should be less expensive to administer (e.g., the 
disallowance of loans and early withdrawals), and there are other reasons 
that would tend to make them more expensive (lower average earnings of 
participants).  Schieber and Shoven report that some large mutual fund 
companies currently manage IRA accounts (with minimum balances as 
low as $500) for total administrative fees ranging from 0.19 to 0.77 percent 
of assets. 
In evaluating cost-efficient structures for social security individual ac- 
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berg and Graetz. They argue that cost efficiency suggests that there be 
only one central record keeper, which they call PSA (personal security ac- 
count) Central. This central record keeper could be operated by social se- 
curity itself, or it could be run by  a private firm operating under contract 
with the federal government. Like Goldberg and Graetz, Schieber and 
Shoven suggest that a government-sponsored bare-bones program be of- 
fered in addition to a wide variety of individual private offerings. Again 
like Goldberg and Graetz, Schieber and Shoven propose piggybacking on 
the existing payroll-tax deduction system. In their plan, private investment 
managers chosen through a request-for-proposals (RFP) procedure would 
run the basic program. The higher-service, higher-cost program offered di- 
rectly by  private asset managers could accept direct deposits (like the ex- 
isting 401[k] plans), keeping the central record keeper informed of all trans- 
actions. Interestingly,  both Goldberg and Graetz and Schieber and Shoven 
(and discussant Olivia Mitchell) argue that a case can be made for the use of 
general federal government revenues in building the administrative infra- 
structure during the start-up phase of an individual accounts program. 
The paper by  James et al. investigates the cost effectiveness of three 
alternative ways of constructing a funded portion of social security. The 
three ways  are (1) individual accounts invested in the retail market with 
relatively open choice (as with 401[k] accounts), (2)  individual accounts 
invested in the institutional market with constrained choice among invest- 
ment companies, and (3) a centralized fund without individual accounts 
or differentiated investments across individuals. The authors estimate the 
cost of each approach. In particular, they ask whether the cost differentials 
are large enough to outweigh other important considerations. 
James et al. gather data regarding the costs of mutual funds and institu- 
tional funds in the United States and evaluate those data econometrically. 
Their findings based on this empirical evidence are that the retail market 
(alternative 1) approach allows individual investors to benefit from scale 
economies in asset management, but  at the cost of high marketing ex- 
penses, which are needed to attract and aggregate small sums of money 
into large pools. In contrast, a centralized fund (alternative 3) can be much 
cheaper because it achieves scale economies without marketing costs but 
gives workers no choice and hence is subject to political manipulation and 
misallocation of capital. The system of constrained choice described by 
James et al. is much cheaper than the retail market and only slightly more 
expensive than a single centralized fund. It obtains scale economies in 
asset management and record keeping while incurring low marketing costs 
and allowing significant worker choice. It is much more effectively insu- 
lated from political interference than a single centralized fund. The au- 
thors estimate that a system of constrained choices and institutional in- 
vestments can be offered at an annual cost of 0.14-0.18  percent of assets. 
The large administrative cost saving over a retail market approach can be Introduction  5 
close to a pure efficiency gain as long as choice is not constrained “too 
much.” 
In his paper on the administrative costs of individual social security ac- 
counts, Diamond differentiates between government-organized accounts 
and privately organized ones. By government-organized accounts, Diamond 
means an individual accounts system in which the government arranges 
for both the record keeping and the investment management for the funds 
in the account. These actual functions might be conducted by the govern- 
ment itself or contracted out to private firms. An example of this approach 
is  the current Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) offered to federal government 
employees. Under Diamond’s privately organized accounts, individuals di- 
rectly select private firms to handle both record keeping and investment 
management. An example of this sort of arrangement is the IRA structure 
in the United States. 
Diamond discusses several alternative ways of measuring and imposing 
the administrative costs of individual accounts. Chile imposes administra- 
tive costs as a front-load fee. That is, a fraction of each contribution is set 
aside for administrative costs. All costs are imposed on contributions- 
the return on assets in the account is not reduced by  these costs. This 
amounts to a prepayment of all administrative costs over the life of the 
assets in the fund. Of course, the more common alternative is to allocate 
administrative costs to assets in the accounts. 
Diamond describes a low-cost government-sponsored program. In esti- 
mating the costs of the program, he uses the costs of the TSP program as 
a starting point. His best estimate is that the administrative costs for such 
accounts would be $40.00-$50.00  per year. This translates to an average of 
0.40-0.50  percent of assets per year over a forty-year career for 2 percent 
accounts. Given the economies of scale, the costs for accounts with higher 
contribution rates would be correspondingly lower. Five percent accounts 
would cost 0.16-0.20  percent of assets per year. 
Diamond estimates that the costs of privately organized accounts would 
be much higher than those of government-organized ones-at  least twice 
as high. He bases this on the experience in Chile and the average costs of 
U.S. mutual funds. Further, he expresses skepticism about the feasibility 
of capping administrative costs at any particular level (such as the 1 per- 
cent of assets suggested by  Schieber and Shoven). Diamond argues that 
measuring administrative costs on such diverse things as certificates of 
deposit, equity mutual funds, guaranteed-investment contracts, and the 
like would be somewhere between very difficult and impossible. In Dia- 
mond’s opinion, government-organized accounts dominate privately orga- 
nized ones. His discussant, Martin Feldstein, disagrees with his cost esti- 
mates for privately organized accounts (he thinks that they are too high 
for a number of reasons) and disagrees with Diamond about the relative 
desirability of government-organized individual accounts. 6  John B. Shoven 
The first four papers all illustrate that there is a continuum between full 
privatization and a purely public social security program. None of  the 
papers evaluates a completely unregulated, fully private system for cost 
and, presumably, other reasons. All of them suggest that there is a role 
for the government in structuring individual accounts programs in a cost- 
effective manner. On the other hand, the types of institutions described in 
these papers still give  individuals considerable choice and control over 
how  their individual account assets are invested. It is my  opinion that 
the papers correctly balance the advantages of  a privatized or partially 
privatized social security program with the cost efficiency of centralized 
record keeping and regulation. 
The fifth paper in this volume is on a distinctly different topic. Poterba 
and Warshawsky present evidence relevant to the administrative costs of 
the payout phase of individual accounts. They examine new data regard- 
ing the costs of purchasing private annuity contracts in order to spread a 
given stock of assets over an uncertain future lifetime. Their paper reports 
three types of evidence and describes the operation of individual annuity 
arrangements within two  large group retirement-saving plans. First, it 
presents current information on life-annuity contracts that are currently 
available in  the  individual single-premium immediate-annuity market- 
place. For a sixty-five-year-old male annuity buyer, the expected present 
discounted value of the payouts offered by  the average policy that was 
available in June 1998 was approximately 85 percent of the purchase price 
of such a policy. This assumes that the individual faces the mortality risks 
of the average individual in the population. However, the expected present 
value of payouts is much higher, 97 percent of the purchase price, and the 
“cost of annuitization” dramatically lower if the buyer faces the mortality 
rates of the typical annuitant. People who buy annuities have significantly 
lower mortality risks than average individuals. This adverse-selection  prob- 
lem would disappear if  annuitization of individual accounts were man- 
datory. 
The second part of the Poterba-Warshawsky paper considers individual 
annuity policies that are available to participants in the federal govern- 
ment’s Thrift Savings Plan. Because these annuities are purchased through 
a large group retirement-saving program, some of the administrative costs 
are lower than those in the national individual annuity market. Corre- 
spondingly, the expected present value of payouts is higher than that in the 
individual annuity marketplace. Finally, the paper describes the individual 
annuity products offered by  TIAA-CREF, the retirement system for col- 
lege and university employees. TIAA offers participating annuities, which 
have among the highest payouts in the individual annuity market. The 
ability to offer these payout levels owes mainly to superior investment re- 
turns and low expenses. Introduction  7 
The bottom-line interpretation  of the Poterba and Warshawsky paper 
in terms of including individual accounts in social security reform is that 
private annuity markets function more efficiently than had been previously 
thought. If the adverse-selection  problem can be mitigated (by, e.g., requir- 
ing everyone to buy annuities), the market promises to be quite efficient. 
Poterba and Warshawsky do not convince David Cutler, their discussant, 
that private annuity markets are highly efficient. 
Perhaps the most important conclusion from the panel of investment- 
industry representatives presented in chapter 6 is that all of them believe 
that a program of cost-efficient individual accounts can be designed and 
operated. That is not to say that administrative costs can be ignored. Far 
from it-all  the panelists think that the details on how the plan is designed 
can affect costs dramatically. Still, statements from executives or former 
executives from Fidelity Investments, the Vanguard Group, State Street 
Bank, Barclays Global Investors, and Aetna Retirement Services that an 
individual account system can be made to work in a cost-efficient manner 
are extremely encouraging for advocates of partially privatizing social se- 
curity. 
There are some themes that come out of the panelist remarks and out 
of  the research papers. First, central record keeping rather than record 
keeping by each plan sponsor or money manager offers considerable cost 
efficiencies. Second, the program of individual accounts should piggyback 
on existing structures where possible. In particular, the collection of con- 
tributions and  the crediting of  accounts  should take advantage  of  the 
existing  payroll-tax  program  and/or  existing  private-sector  defined- 
contribution pension plans. Of course, some proposals for individual ac- 
counts do not depend on contributions per se but rather are funded from 
the federal government budget surplus. Third, there are important advan- 
tages to having a strong low-cost default option for small accounts or for 
participants who are willing to sacrifice some level of choice and service 
for low cost. The low-cost nature of the default option is feasible but may 
require periodic valuation (monthly or quarterly) rather than daily valua- 
tion, limited asset choices, restricted withdrawals (no early withdrawals or 
loans), and infrequent deposits (e.g., once per year). Fourth, costs could 
be reduced if employees or employers were involved in the record keeping, 
but not both. 
After attending the conference and assembling these papers, my  own 
conclusion is that there is a general consensus on both the feasibility of 
cost-efficient individual accounts  and  the  design features necessary  to 
achieve low administrative'expenses. That is not to say that there still is 
not a lot of work to be done before we  choose how to reform social secu- 
rity. One issue that is  briefly discussed in this volume that needs more 
examination (and is getting it in an NBER volume edited by John Camp- 8  John B. Shoven 
bell and Martin Feldstein, tentatively entitled Risk Aspects of  Investment- 
Based Social Security Reform) is the risks borne by individual participants 
in  the alternative social security reform proposals. The issue is  how to 
preserve the social safety net in a program with individual choice with 
respect to asset allocation and risk taking. A second issue (briefly dis- 
cussed by Robert Pozen in this volume) is the effect that individual account 
investments could potentially have on asset prices. Would this effect be 
particularly severe if most of the money were placed in passively managed 
index funds? This is an important topic for future research. My own prior 
is that even the largest of the partial privatization plans being discussed 
(those with 5 percent of covered payroll being invested) could be absorbed 
by  U.S. and global financial markets with only a slight effect on prices. 
Nonetheless, additional attention to this issue is  warranted.  While this 
volume cannot possibly address all the issues surrounding individual ac- 
counts, it does make a significant contribution toward social security re- 
form-it  offers clear guidance on how to organize a cost-efficient program 
of personal accounts. 